PortSwigger “Concealing payloads in URL credentials” talks about concealing XSS payloads in URL credentials. The nice thing is that this makes the payload invisible to WAFs and other server-side XSS filters. You can actually conceal the payloads in other places
In a previous post, I described a pass-the-permission-ticket vulnerability in UMA 2.0 in which a malicious UMA resource server could kindly ask a UMA client to give it access tokens actually intended for another UMA resource server. In this post, I am describing a similar attack when the authorization server is malicious.
Pass-the-permission-ticket vulnerability in UMA 2.0
Published:
In the User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 protocol, a malicious resource server (or a malicious server acting as a resource server) can obtain a requesting party (access) token (RPT) intended for another UMA resource server from a UMA client by passing a permission ticket obtained from the target resource server to the UMA client. This can compromise the privacy (confidentiality) and integrity of UMA protected resources.
In this post, I am describing some payloads which I used to bypass two distinct XSS filter implementations (such as Web Application Firewalls (WAF)) as well as the approach to design them.