Published:
In a previous post, I described a pass-the-permission-ticket vulnerability in UMA 2.0 in which a malicious UMA resource server could kindly ask a UMA client to give it access tokens actually intended for another UMA resource server. In this post, I am describing a similar attack when the authorization server is malicious.
Published:
In the User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 protocol, a malicious resource server (or a malicious server acting as a resource server) can obtain a requesting party (access) token (RPT) intended for another UMA resource server from a UMA client by passing a permission ticket obtained from the target resource server to the UMA client. This can compromise the privacy (confidentiality) and integrity of UMA protected resources.
Published:
A sequence diagram for WebSub.
Published:
An interesting note from the FBI.
Published:
Some diagrams (mostly sequence diagrams) about UMA 2.0.
Published:
An interesting spoofing attack resulting from the interaction between Firefox (or Thunderbird) MIME types handling and file managers.
Published:
A dangerous file type association in Debian which could be used to trigger arbitrary code execution.
Published:
Some sequence diagrams about OAuth 2.x and OpenID Connect.
Published:
Some context and analysis about attacks on in WebDriver implementations.
Published:
Some notes about how TLS v1.3 works. This is a follow-up of the previous episode about TLS v1.2. As before, the goal is to have a high-level overview about how the protocol works, what is the role of the different messages and be able to understand (and debug) a network traffic dump.
Page 1 of 2 | Previous page | Next page | JSON Feed | Atom Feed